Invisible genomes: the genomics revolution and patenting practice by Bostanci, Adam & Calvert, Jane
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Invisible genomes: the genomics revolution and patenting
practice
Citation for published version:
Bostanci, A & Calvert, J 2008, 'Invisible genomes: the genomics revolution and patenting practice' Studies
in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical
Sciences, vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 109-19. DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsc.2007.12.010
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1016/j.shpsc.2007.12.010
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and
Biomedical Sciences
Publisher Rights Statement:
NOTICE: this is the author's version of a work that was accepted for publication in Studies in History and
Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences.
Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting,
and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to
this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Studies in
History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical
Sciences, 39(1), 109-19, doi: 10.1016/j.shpsc.2007.12.010
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
 1 
 
 
 
Invisible Genomes: 
The Genomics Revolution and Patenting Practice 
  
Published as: Bostanci, A., & Calvert, J. (2008). Invisible genomes: the genomics revolution 
and patenting practice. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in 
History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 39(1), 109-19, doi: 
10.1016/j.shpsc.2007.12.010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adam Bostanci* 
ESRC Centre for Genomics in Society 
University of Exeter 
a.w.s.bostanci@ex.ac.uk 
 
Jane Calvert 
ESRC Centre for Genomics in Society 
University of Exeter 
 2 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
In the mid-1990s, the company Human Genome Sciences submitted three potentially 
revolutionary patent applications to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, each of which 
claimed the entire genome sequence of a microorganism. The patent examiners, however, 
objected to these applications, and after negotiation they were eventually re-written to 
resemble more traditional gene patents. In this paper, which is based on a study of the patent 
examination files, we examine the reasons why these patent applications were unsuccessful in 
their original form. We show that with respect to utility and novelty, the patent attorney's case 
built on an understanding of the genome as a computer-related invention. The patent 
examiners did not object to the patenting of complete genome sequences as computer-related 
inventions on moral grounds or in terms of the distinction between a discovery and an 
invention. Instead, their objections were based on classification, rules and procedure.  Rather 
than patent examiners having a notion of a genome that should not be patented, the notion of a 
‘genome’, and the ways in which it may be different from a ‘gene’, played no role in these 
debates. Our findings have far-reaching consequences for patenting in the biosciences.  
 
Keywords: Genome; Genomics; Bioinformatics; Intellectual Property Rights; Patent; Classification 
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Introduction 
The esoteric realm of patent practice might, at first glance, seem a strange place to look for 
reflections about the nature of biological entities like genomes. During the process of patent 
examination, however, decisions have to be made about whether such entities are eligible for 
patent protection. Views have to be formed about the nature of these entities and whether they 
qualify as inventions. We became interested how the entity called ‘the genome’ was seen in 
patent practice. More specifically, we were interested in whether patent examiners perceived 
genomes differently from genes, which have been routinely patented since the 1980s.
1
 
 
This question was raised for us by the discovery of three patent applications filed by the 
company Human Genome Sciences in the mid-1990s. These applications were unusual in that 
they not only sought to claim as an invention the complete genome sequences of three 
microorganisms (Haemophilus influenzae, Mycoplasma genitalium, and Methanococcus 
jannaschii), but they claimed these genome sequences in computer-embodied form. By the 
time patents were granted for these applications, however, the invention claims had been 
modified to cover only a small number of genes. We wanted to find out why the scope of 
these patent applications was restricted in this way, and whether arguments about the 
patentability of genomes played a role in this process. At the time, biology was undergoing a 
transformation due to the rise of computing, the internet, and bioinformatics, so these patent 
applications raise the question of whether a genome can be understood as a computer-related 
invention. 
 
It is easy to speculate about why these patent applications might have been rejected. 
Intuitively, genomes are conceived as intimately connected with, or even constituting, the 
nature of an organism and are therefore presumed to be unpatentable (see Blute, 2005). This 
view has fuelled broader political and moral debates about the desirability of human gene 
patenting. In addition, Eisenberg (2000), who has offered the only scholarly discussion of 
these patent applications, has argued that genomes ought not to be patented in this way 
because a genome sequence is 'scientific information' that constitutes a basis for future 
scientific discovery.
2
 She also makes the point that while DNA sequence information may 
well have commercial value, allowing such claims would amount to a back-door extension of 
a patent system that was originally designed for 'bricks and mortar' inventions to intangible 
inventions, an extension that has not been subjected to proper policy or legal analysis. 
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These intuitions notwithstanding, a previous survey has found that a number of patents for 
whole genomes have nevertheless been issued, albeit primarily as patents for biochemical 
entities with a view to the pathological specificity of particular microoganisms (O'Malley et 
al., 2005).
3
 While Eisenberg has provided an argument for why genomes ought not to be 
patented in computer-readable form, we wanted to explore why they were in practice not 
deemed patentable in this way by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). In brief, 
we found that computer-embodiment was indeed part of the patent attorney's case for 
patenting the whole genome, whereas patent examiners failed to see the genome as an 
invention because of the rules that govern patent examination and because of the patent 
classification system. 
 
We begin this paper by providing an overview of the patent system and of the patent 
examination process as they emerge from our case study. We then review the scientific 
history of the three genomes and the patent applications, making reference in particular to 
Cook-Deegan’s (1994) argument about the inseparability of computing from genomics. In our 
analytical section, we show that computer-related arguments figured in the case the patent 
attorney made for the patentability of the genome. A utility for the genome as a computer-
related invention was articulated, although, in contrast to gene patents, this utility did not 
coincide with the presumed biological function of the genome. Also with respect to novelty, 
we find that computer-embodiment was part of building a case for the patentability of the 
genome. We then consider reasons why the genome as presented in the patent applications 
remained 'invisible' to examiners. Here, we discuss the all-important classification scheme 
employed by the patent office. The tripartite nature of the U.S. patent classification system—
mechanical, chemical, and electrical—and the requirement of 'restriction' means that the 
applicants were forced to restrict their invention claims to selected genes only. This not only 
rid the applications of their computer-related claims, it also meant that they had to give up on 
patenting a complete genome. We end with some thoughts about role of patent classification 
and its implications for the future patenting of biological entities as biological research moves 
towards systems biology and nanotechnology. 
 
Methodology 
The scholarly literature on intellectual property usually analyses laws, cases and judgments. 
Others have studied how scientists and patent professionals produce texts (Myers, 1995; 
Packer and Webster, 1995; 1996). In contrast, this paper is based on an analysis of patent 
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examination files. We used the online Patent Application Information Retrieval system of the 
USPTO to identify the patent applications that gave rise to the most correspondence between 
patent attorneys and patent examiners from the patent families associated with the three 
genomes.
4
 The patent examination files contain all correspondence leading up to a patent 
being issued, and they are typically 1000-2000 pages long, although much of the file is taken 
up with a print-out of the complete genome sequence.
5
 By studying the file histories, we see 
how decisions are made during patent examination. In addition, this analysis draws on the 
scientific articles describing the complete genome sequences and on interviews with scientists 
involved in the production of these genome sequences as well as the patent attorney who 
prepared the genome patent applications.
6
 
 
Patenting Genomes 
A patent is a contract between government and inventor, preventing others from making, 
using or selling the invention for a period of 20 years. In turn, the inventor makes the 
invention available for the benefit of the public. In the US, the basic conditions for 
patentability are that the invention is novel, non-obvious (to someone ‘skilled in the art’) and 
useful. Generally 'anything under the sun made by man' may be patentable (see Kevles, 2002, 
p.25), although 'laws of nature', 'abstract ideas', and 'products of nature' are explicitly barred 
from patent protection. Since the three patent applications we analyse here were originally 
filed and examined at the USPTO, the primary research presented in this paper mainly reflects 
U.S. patent practice. We also studied the examination of genome patent applications at the 
European Patent Office for comparative purposes. 
 
The patentability of DNA and inventions in the field of molecular biology has been firmly 
established since the Chakrabarty decision of the Supreme Court in 1980, where a patent was 
granted on a modified bacterium (Kevles, 2002). In this case, it was held that biotechnological 
inventions were eligible for patent protection due to their analogy with chemical inventions. 
Following the Chakrabarty case, many different kinds of patents in molecular biology were 
issued. Precedent was set that 'isolated and purified' nucleic acid molecules, such as a human 
gene excised from a chromosome, are patentable like other isolated and purified chemical 
compounds. However, 'gene patenting' has been mired in controversy. For example, patent 
applications for partial human gene sequences have been contested with respect to their utility 
within the scientific community (Cook-Deegan, 1994; Marshall, 1994). More recently, human 
gene patents have given rise to debates that are often framed in moral terms and derive their 
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force from the idea that the genome constitutes the nature of the organism (Sulston and Ferry, 
2002). 
 
The patent applications for the complete genome sequences of H. influenzae, M. genitalium, 
and M. jannaschii were filed in the mid-1990s, a time when DNA sequencing capacity was 
growing rapidly, due to the availability of automatic DNA sequencing machines. The ability 
to sequence whole genomes led to an exponential increase in the number of DNA-related 
patent applications filed at the USPTO (Marshall reported a ninety year backlog of DNA-
related applications in 1996). Partial human gene sequences in particular were often covered 
by blanket patent applications containing a large number of DNA sequences. These 
developments were addressed by new bureaucratic measures. Most importantly for this paper, 
a rule was added to the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) that no more than ten 
DNA sequences could be claimed in a single patent application – a simple measure to manage 
the workload of the USPTO (USPTO, 2001). 
 
As well as being influenced by gene patenting, the genome patents discussed in this paper 
were influenced by another contemporary development, the patenting of computer-related 
inventions (interview Millman). Such inventions were not considered patentable until the 
mid-1990s when, following a series of judgments, the USPTO developed ‘Examination 
Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions’, which set out that software can be patented in 
conjunction with a specific machine as a 'programmed computer', but excluded computer 
media storing 'non-functional descriptive material' such as music (USPTO, 1996). These 
guidelines instruct patent examiners on how to assess patent applications for 'computer-
related' inventions. 
 
Patent examination involves a patent examiner, acting for the government, and a patent 
attorney, acting for the inventors. In the first step, the examiner reads the two parts of the 
patent application: the 'specification' and the 'claims'. The former provides a general 
discussion of the invention, while the latter summarises what the applicants see as their 
specific inventive achievements (Figure 1). Once a patent is granted, the claims are normally 
taken to define the scope of protection given by the patent. Patent professionals often treat the 
specification as largely inconsequential, but in the initial stages of patent examination, the 
specification is arguably more important than the claims, because it gives the examiner an 
impression of what the applicants believe to be their invention. Much of our argument below 
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draws on the patent specifications. Subsequently, the examiner identifies the relevant patent 
classes in U.S. Patent Classification system and conducts a 'search' of 'prior art' to assess 
whether the invention fulfils the criteria for patentability (USPTO, 2005). As with any other 
contract, the next step is normally a negotiation between the examiner and the attorney to 
establish the precise wording of the invention claims. 
 
A lesser-known aspect of patenting is 'restriction'. If, after the initial reading of the patent 
application, the examiner comes to the view that the application in fact encompasses several 
different inventions, he can demand 'restriction' to a single invention. Restriction can be 
required if more than one 'independent and distinct' invention is claimed per application and if 
search and examination of these inventions would impose a 'serious burden' on the examiner 
(USPTO, 2001). The purpose of this rule is to prevent inventors from protecting more than 
one invention in a single patent, and to reject applications that overwhelm the examiner with 
complex claims that require searches in multiple fields of prior art. Clearly, it would be 
impractical and impossible to search all previous inventions described in some seven million 
patents for each new patent application. Since misclassification threatens to confound future 
searches for prior art, consistent patent classification is in the interest of the USPTO 
examiners. As we argue in our conclusion, the importance of classification in the work of a 
patent office can hardly be overestimated. 
 
Patent examination emerges from our case study as a rather innocuous process, governed by 
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, the U.S. Patent Classification, as well as specific 
guidelines, for example for 'computer-related' inventions. However, given the technical nature 
of inventions and the requirement that inventions be novel, one would expect that the 
distinction between one and several inventions is not always clear-cut. While patent law has 
procedures for dealing with difficult cases, patent practitioners have pointed out that 
restriction is difficult to understand, operates imperfectly and would benefit from 
simplification (Henry, 2004). All this matters because for the applications for the genomes of 
H. influenzae, M. genitalium, and M. jannaschii, one of the most important arguments 
between the patent examiners and the patent attorneys was over whether restriction was 
required or not; that is, whether the patent described one or several inventions. 
 
This leads us to a final aspect of patenting practice: unlike legal arguments in court, the patent 
examination process does not encourage lengthy arguments. MPEP constrains the outcome of 
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disagreements. If the applicants disagree with the examiner they may set out a counter-
argument but at the same time they are obliged to choose one of the inventions identified by 
the examiner for further examination. For this reason, the disputes over the patentability of the 
three genomes we are analysing here gave rise to arguments that may be described as succinct 
or perhaps even cryptic. Extensive textual analysis was required to bring to the fore what the 
key argumentative exchanges consisted in and why the patent attorneys failed to persuade the 
examiner to view the genome as a patentable invention. Although we expected to find 
arguments about the nature of the genome in the patent application files, the exchanges 
between applicants and patent examiner hardly considered the nature of the genome at all. 
Instead, the genome, as articulated in the patent application, was all but invisible to the patent 
examiner. 
 
The Scientific History of the Genomes 
The three genomes were sequenced at The Institute for Genomic Research (TIGR), a not-for-
profit organisation headed by Craig Venter, who later became CEO of the company Celera 
Genomics. At the time, TIGR was bound by a contractual relationship with Human Genome 
Sciences, which gave the company a period of six months to secure intellectual property 
protection for all TIGR discoveries. This arrangement led to a dispute over the publication of 
the first of the three genomes, that of H. influenzae. While TIGR scientists wanted to publish 
a scientific paper describing the genome, the company wanted to ensure that no potentially 
valuable intellectual property was forfeited, and for each of the three genomes a patent was 
filed before the publication of the sequence data to ensure priority (Shreeve, 2004). The patent 
application for the H. influenzae genome then served as a template for those subsequently 
filed for M. genitalium and M. jannaschii, and broadly similar argumentative exchanges 
between the applicants and the examiner are found in the three files. For this reason, we 
discuss all three file histories together.
 
 
 
Once published (Fleischmann et al., 1995), the genome sequence of H. influenzae was hailed 
as a milestone in the history of biology for being the first complete genome sequence of a 
self-replicating organism (Nowak, 1995; Wade, 1995). Whereas previously it had been 
possible to determine the DNA sequences of particular genes or the genome sequence of 
simple viruses, automated DNA sequencing machines along with the data-processing powers 
of computers now made it possible to determine the DNA sequence of an entire microbial 
genome. The analysis involved further computationally-aided comparisons of the genome 
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sequence with the DNA sequences collected in databases such as GenBank, and identification 
of genes and their functions on the basis of DNA sequence similarity.  
 
The choice of organisms illustrates the broader biological ambitions connected with this 
research. While H. influenzae was simply the experimental organism of a laboratory 
associated with TIGR, the other two organisms were chosen more strategically. It was 
expected that the H. influenzae genome would contain complete sets of genes known to be 
'essential for life'. However, when the genome was analysed by identifying sequence 
similarities within the genome sequence with database matches to known genes, three 
enzymes that had been assumed to be universal were missing. For this reason, TIGR scientists 
decided to next sequence the smallest known bacterial genome, that of Mycoplasma 
genitalium, which at the time was thought to possess the smallest genome for a self-
replicating organism and, thus the reasoning, should possess all essential genes (Fraser et al., 
1995). The third organism that was sequenced, Methanococcus jannaschii
7
 is an Archaeon (a 
type of organism structurally similar to bacteria but genetically different), and it was chosen 
so that all three domains of life (Archaea, Bacteria, Eukaryota) could be compared. Moreover, 
M. jannaschii’s ability to survive without oxygen and to synthesize organic materials from 
inorganic chemicals made it interesting to biotechnology, astrobiology and biology in general. 
Scientists hoped that the genome sequence would help understand these biological capacities 
(Bult et al., 1996). These research projects were motivated by the hope that knowledge of 
complete genome sequences would provide a more global view of the metabolism of the 
organisms and perhaps even an understanding of the genomic basis of self-replicating life. 
 
In his influential account of the early history of the Human Genome Project, Cook-Deegan 
(1994) argues that, at the time, "computers, and mathematical algorithms [were] as important 
as DNA sequencing, cloning, and other more obviously biological techniques," (p.288) and 
that advances in computing were an "essential element in the pursuit of genetic knowledge" 
(p.291).  Discoveries could be made "simply by comparing [sequence] data in different 
databases" (p.293). He also shows that it was still unclear whether software development to 
support this research would be controlled by scientists or private vendors. Arguably, 
knowledge of the three genomes discussed above, achieved through elucidation of the 
complete sequence and subsequent analysis by means of computer-aided database searches, 
depended on advances in computing as highlighted by Cook-Deegan. As we will see, the 
patent attorney representing Human Genome Sciences made a similar argument. 
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Patent Applications 
As indicated above, the reason why these patent applications were so unusual was the 
emphasis on the genome as a computer-related invention. For example, the first invention 
claim in the H influenzae and M. genitalium genome patent applications reads: 'Computer 
readable medium having recorded thereon the nucleotide sequence depicted in SEQ ID NO:1'. 
SEQ ID NO:1 represented the entire sequence of the genome, which was defined as the 'life 
sustaining instructions and information' of the organism (USPTO Appl. Nos. 08/476,102; 
08/545,528). Influenced by the emerging patentability of computer-related inventions, the 
patent applications even include a diagram of a computer-system with a storage medium 
carrying the genome sequence (Figure 2), and for the H. influenzae genome, the field of 
invention was changed from 'molecular biology' to 'bioinformatics' after the application was 
filed (Examination File, Amendment A, 12 September 1995). The patent specifications 
explained that the genome sequence in computer-readable form would serve for homology 
searches (i.e. comparisons with other DNA sequence databases), with the aim of identifying 
commercially or biologically important fragments of the genome. The applications also 
mentioned that knowledge of the genome sequence would further the 'understanding of 
chromosome structure and function', 'the structure, position, and spacing of regulatory 
elements' and the ability to do 'comparative genomic and 'molecular phylogeny', although 
these utilities were not expounded in depth. 
 
The applicants not only attempted to claim the genome sequence in computer-readable media, 
they also attempted to claim isolated fragments of the genome and the proteins encoded by the 
genome. Arguably, the identification of all these valuable fragments is testament to the utility 
of the genome in computer-embodied from. Perhaps this can also be understood in the 
tradition of gene patenting, where a single patent often protects a range of different 
biochemical entities including the nucleotide sequence, the protein encoded by the sequence, 
and the antibodies that selectively bind to the protein. If a 'gene patent' can achieve all of this, 
then it might seem plausible that a 'genome patent' might encompass all of these applications 
for all the genes of an organism. 
 
These claims gave rise to an argument between patent examiner and attorney. The examiner 
felt that the applications covered several different groups of inventions and, for M. genitalium, 
he demanded restriction to one of the following groups: I. computer readable medium, II. 
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computer system, III. methods of using a plurality of nucleic acid sequences, IV. individual 
open reading frames (i.e. sections of the genome that code for example for proteins, referred 
to below as ‘ORFs’), V. non-coding nucleic acid sequences, VI. peptides, and VII. antibodies. 
He argued that these seven different types of invention are unrelated because they have 
'different modes of operation', 'different chemical structures, physical properties and utilities'. 
He argued that because they fell into different patent classes this meant that they had 
'divergent subject matter' (Restriction, 29 January 1999). In this rather circular manner, he 
relied on the pre-existing classification scheme to decide how to separate out the different 
types of invention. 
 
The patent attorney (acting on behalf of the inventors) objected that restriction to one of these 
groups was not required because search and examination would not be unduly onerous. The 
records in the file indicate that, in making this argument, he may have drawn on his 
experience with H. influenzae, where electronic searches with the term 'genom?' in the 
database of the USPTO during the preparation of the patent application had revealed no 
countervailing prior art (Amendment A). Perhaps encouraged by this experience, he argued 
that searches of the different groups would not be a burden, explaining that in most 
publications 'where a published polynucleotide is shown, the authors also include the 
computer readable medium, a computer system, polypeptides, antibodies, and methods using 
a plurality of nucleic acid sequences'. Like Cook-Deegan, he suggested that in genomics 
advances in computing and in molecular analysis went hand in hand to such an extent that 'the 
evolution of one is tied to the existence of the other' (Amendment C, 5 March 1999). 
 
But the examiner remained adamant, maintaining that 'computer hardware is an entirely 
different technology from molecular biology' (emphasis added), and that searches for 'nucleic 
acid molecules would never uncover art related to computer systems'. For him the fact that 'all 
the [genes] are presented as part of one SEQ ID', that all the DNA sequences being claimed 
were combined in one long sequence, was merely a matter of presentation, they were still 
'unrelated' nucleic acid sequences (Rejection, 30 December 1999). He saw no necessary 
relationship between the different genes inherited in one chromosome. Consequently, the 
examiner was overwhelmed by the number of searches required for all the possible fragments 
mentioned in the application. He saw the genome patent application as if it were an 
application for a large number of gene sequences. As a result of these objections, the 
applicants restricted their claims to category IV above – ten different genes. This shows that 
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the genomes were disqualified from patent protection because of the restriction requirement 
rather than on the grounds of any principled objection to the patenting of genome sequence as 
biological information. Restriction was the most significant move in the examination of these 
patent applications, because this forced the applicants to drop their claims for the whole 
genome, and subsequently the patent applications became more conventional. These more 
conventional patents were eventually issued approximately eight years after the original 
applications were filed.
8
  
 
Discussion 
1. The Genome as a Computer-related Invention: Function and Utility 
In the original patent applications, the patent attorney described the genome sequence as the 
'life sustaining instructions and information' of the organism. This view of the genome ties 
into more general and popular analogies between information and DNA (Kay, 2000). One 
patent practitioner, unconnected to our case study, even reversed the analogy to argue for the 
patentability of software. He suggested a 'programmed floppy disk or other storage device 
performs much of the same role for the machine in question, e.g., a computer system, as a 
DNA sequence does for  a cell. Both encode information used in controlling and directing the 
operation of a cell or of a computer system' (Toedt, 1995). 
 
However, as philosophers of biology have pointed out, it is problematic to think of the 
genome as biological information, or of DNA as the ‘master molecule’ that determines all 
organismal functions. Thinking in this way can result in traits like pathogenicity and 
thermostability being attributed to DNA, when these traits are now thought to emerge at 
higher levels of biological organisation. Although Godfrey-Smith allows that the idea of 
'genetic coding' can justifiably be used to describe the role of DNA in specifying protein 
structure (Godfrey-Smith, 2000; Neumann-Held, 2006), Griffiths (2001) has argued that it is a 
mistake to move from the notion of the genetic code to general views of organismal processes 
as information encoded in the genome sequence. The general problem is that, both in terms of 
structure and function, the genome is not easily separated form the cellular and organismal 
context, and it is not clear to what extent our understanding of the organism is aided by 
imagining its genome as disembodied information (Sarkar, 1996). 
 
The informational view of the genome as a discovery system articulated in the patent 
applications is more interesting. By transferring the DNA sequence to computer-readable 
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medium the sequence was transformed into a discovery system that could be set in relation to 
other DNA sequence databases to identify functional fragments. The computer-embodiment 
made the genome useful (Shreeve, 2004; interview Millman). Crucially, the utility of the 
genome in this case is substantially different from the utility we find in gene patents, which is 
usually articulated by referring to the biological function of the gene. The utility of such 
computer-based homology searching does not coincide with the presumed biological function 
of a genome: the 'programming' of a cell. However, the envisaged utility of the genome 
sequences of H. influenzae, M. genitalium and M. jannaschii as computer-related inventions 
for homology searching was not formally examined at the USPTO because restriction, the 
examiner's stipulation that the application concerned different kinds of inventions, took place 
prior to examination based on the criteria for patentability. Examination of the files shows that 
these utility claims were not pursued beyond the initial application. The fact that these 
genome applications were unsuccessful therefore does not imply that a genome sequence in 
silico lacks utility, as Eisenberg assumed. 
 
A more radical interpretation of these patents, albeit one that the examiners never considered 
and the attorney did not develop explicitly, is that the genome sequence is a computer-related 
invention in the sense suggested by Cook-Deegan. If we set aside the a priori view that the 
micro-organismal chromosome is biological information, then the transformation of DNA, 
falling into the realm of chemistry, into a computer-readable sequence, falling into the realm 
of electronics, can indeed be seen as an inventive technological achievement that depended on 
advances in computing. Global views of genome sequences depend on computer capacity to 
process large amounts of DNA sequence data. Without the aid of computers, the genome 
sequence, several thousand pages in length when printed, was not interpretable. The 
assignment of a function, or at least of a putative function, to each of the genes in the genome 
proceeded by means of homology searches to identify matching gene entries in existing DNA 
databases. TIGR scientists similarly recall that it was only possible to publish a description of 
a genome sequence in a scientific publication once this analysis had been carried out, and a 
story could be told about the genome (interview White). Without this analysis, the genome 
sequence data was unintelligible. Hence, an argument can be made that the production of a 
genome from chromosomal DNA is computer-dependent, as the patent attorney also seemed 
to suggest. 
 
 14 
2. Genomes: wholes and parts 
For all three genome patents, parts of the sequence had been made publicly available before 
the filing of the patent. On first glance, prior knowledge of these parts would threaten to 
undermine the novelty of the claims for the complete sequences. In this section we explore the 
relationships between genomes (wholes) and genes (parts), and we show that computer-
embodiment can again strengthen the case for the patentability of the genome. 
 
In the case of H. influenzae, a total of 59 ORFs were known before the genome project. The 
applicants 'explicitly disclaimed' these ORFS in their application as far as their molecular 
claims were concerned and felt no need to reflect on whether prior knowledge of these ORFs 
would affect their claims for a computer-embodied genome sequence (Amendment A). Since 
they envisaged using the whole genome as a discovery device, we may assume, employing 
interpretative charity, that they felt that their invention was not anticipated by a small number 
of known genes. This position becomes even more credible if we think of the computer-
embodiment of the genome as providing insights into characteristics of the genome, such as 
the relationships between genes. If the emphasis is on properties of the genome, then 
knowledge of a small number of particular genes would not necessarily imply lack of novelty, 
although the applicants did not develop a formal argument along these lines. 
 
After restriction, the applicants reformulated their invention claims. They now focused their 
claims on an 'isolated polynucleotide' that comprises the nucleic acid sequence of particular 
ORFs. The examiner objected that this could also be taken to also refer to 'isolated 
chromosomal DNA' that had been described in the scientific literature years earlier. In other 
words, the examiner pointed out that the way the applicants had phrased a claim for a gene 
could also apply to an entire chromosome. This was inadmissible for it would rule out the 
novelty of the invention because isolated chromosomal DNA had been described years earlier. 
The applicants responded to this objection by adding the word 'fragment' to their claim 
language. Rather than referring to an ‘isolated polynucleotide’, the amended claims were 
changed to refer to an ‘isolated polynucleotide fragment’ (Amendment D, 12 November 
1999). This modification made the claims narrower and more specific so they could no longer 
be taken to refer to the isolated chromosomes of the three microorganisms.
9
 
 
The word 'isolated' is important here because in patent law a gene only becomes patentable 
once it has been 'excised from a natural chromosome' and isolated from its natural context. 
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The necessity, imposed by patent law, to isolate fragments in order to patent them raises 
problems for genome patenting. By definition, it is not possible to excise a genome from a 
chromosome, since in molecular terms the genome comprises all of the DNA in an organism's 
complement of chromosomes. This implies that a whole genome sequence cannot be claimed 
in the way in which one would normally claim an isolated molecule as a fragment.
10
 Indeed, 
the patent attorney recalled that the computer-embodiment set the genome apart from 
previous preparations of chromosomal DNA (interview Millman).  As a computer-related 
invention, the genome can immediately be seen as distinct from 'isolated chromosomal DNA’, 
because a molecular entity is transformed into a discovery system embodied in a computer. 
Hence, the computer-embodiment was also chosen to avoid anticipation of the genome as an 
invention by prior preparations of purified chromosomal DNA.
11
  
 
3. US Patent Classification and Restriction 
Historically, US Patent Classification is organised as a tripartite categorisation of inventions 
as mechanical, chemical, or electrical artefacts. Perhaps this helps us understand why the 
patent examiner felt that the applications encompassed different kinds of technology 
('Searches for nucleic acid molecules would never uncover art related to computer systems'), 
even when the patent attorney suggested that in genomics advances in computing and in 
molecular analysis go hand in hand.  During examination, each patent application is in the 
first instance associated with one particular patent class, and we have already pointed out that 
consistent classification is integral to the work of examiners, who have to search prior art on a 
daily basis. While this is defensible as good patenting practice, the picture that emerges from 
this characterisation of patenting has far-reaching consequences. 
 
The patent applications for complete genomes failed because the patent examiner felt they 
encompassed different kinds of technology. Arguably, his reasoning – that there are different 
groups of inventions because they fall in different classes of the US Patent Classification 
system – leads to a logical regress. One might ask by virtue of what the different classes were 
established. This question was not raised during patent examination. Moreover, in contrast to 
the Chakrabarty case, there was no impetus to create a new patent class to accommodate the 
subject-matter described in these patent applications, perhaps because these applications were 
not seen to mark the introduction of an important new technology. This implies that all future 
inventions will be seen relative to the grooves of the US Patent Classification. Perhaps the 
inventions described in the patent applications for H. influenzae, M. genitalium and M. 
 16 
jannaschii were 'invisible' simply because they did not fit into the established patent classes.
12
 
 
More generally, Mol and de Laet have shown in a discussion of 'the Zimbabwe bush pump' 
that the definition of a technology can occur at many levels (De Laet and Mol, 2000). What 
we unreflectively perceive as a simple bush pump can be defined by its parts, by the specific 
installation of these parts, the hydraulic principles that operate within 'the parts', or even the 
broader social configuration around the pump. It is the presumption of a unifying character 
that makes a physical assemblage into a 'bush pump'. With respect to the genome, this 
approach raises a number of difficult questions. The examiner, acting for the USPTO, 
perceived the application as merely listing a large number of genes, whereas the patent 
attorney acting on behalf of Human Genome Sciences provided some tentative arguments for 
seeing the whole genome as a computer-related invention. Ultimately, in patenting practice it 
would appear that whether an innovation appears as one or many inventions depends how it is 
related to bodies of literature, precedents, and perhaps even different legal regimes. In the 
case of the genome as a computer-related invention, such an entity was not articulated clearly 
enough. The genome as a computer-related invention was invisible to the patent system, and 
the patent applications were unsuccessful as originally filed. 
 
Conclusion 
Eisenberg cautioned against genome sequence patents on the grounds that patenting genomic 
information would amount to an unconsidered extension of patent law. Others have mounted 
a broad range of social, moral, and political arguments against the desirability of patenting 
biological entities like genes. However, patent examination in the USA has no mechanism for 
establishing the socio-political desirability of a patent, nor a formal system for deciding when 
new patent classes should be created for new kinds of inventions.
13
 We have shown that 
patent examiners, relying on the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure and the U.S. Patent 
Classification system, formed a view on the patentability of the genome only indirectly in 
following rules and procedure. In fact, one might say that in not recognising the 'genome' as 
an invention, the examination process at the USPTO “worked” remarkably well, in relation to 
its own interests to operate on the basis of a conservative classification system for inventive 
artefacts, which ensures the smooth running of the operation. 
 
In this paper, we have suggested that claims for the genome as a computer-related invention 
were integral to the attempt to build a case for the patentability of the genome and not 
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altogether implausible. Structurally and functionally, knowledge of the genome depended on 
advances in computing. Moreover, as a computer-related invention, the utility of the genome 
differed from its presumed biological function, and computer-embodiment also circumvented 
the problem of anticipation of the invention by isolated chromosomal DNA. We might add 
that the view of the genome as a computer-related invention distinct from chromosomal DNA 
would remove many of the moral and political concerns associated with patenting inventions 
derived from biological materials. Incidentally, this implies that we see patents as contracts 
that protect inventions, rather than bestowing ownership of biological entities, a view that 
should, we expect, coincide with patent practitioners' understanding of patents. 
 
However, owing to the strictures of the U.S. patent classification system, computer-
embodiment was ruled out of court and with it fell the case for the patentability of the 
genome. Patent examiners were not concerned with the distinction between a natural entity 
and an invention, or with the broader moral and political debates about the propriety of 
patenting biological entities like genes. Perhaps one might even say that the rules and 
procedures were applied to such an extent that the examiner lost sight of the genome as a 
possible computer-related invention. Examiners insisted on the categories established by 
precedent and refused to grant a patent on a genome; but this is because they saw a 'bag of 
genes' where the applicants tentatively articulated a 'genome'. Our examination of the files 
containing the to and fro between patent attorney and examiner shows that, paradoxically, a 
genome as seen through the eyes of the patent office is too many inventions, that is genes, 
rather than not inventive enough. 
 
These finding have far-reaching consequences for biology-related inventions. The increasing 
practical utility of biological information in computer form means that we are likely to see an 
increase in informational patents in the future (Maschio and Kowalski, 2001). For example, in 
the field of systems biology vast quantities of disparate types of biological information are 
combined in computer models. Systems biology takes the computer-embodiment of biological 
information further than genomics to transcriptomes, proteomes, metabolomes and their 
interactions, as well as emergent properties and models. Patent applications and even some 
issued patents already cover these models (Allarakhia and Wensley, 2005). Arguably systems 
biology patents are better described as computer tools than biological information, but 
perhaps, as with the difficult distinction between the computer-embodiment of a genome and 
the genome itself, the distinction between computer tools and biological information is 
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becoming hard to establish in practice. As a consequence, the patent system may be 
increasingly stretched by these developments in contemporary biology.  
 
Another scenario is that, if not a return to 'bricks and mortar' patenting, future patenting in the 
realm of biology might become solidly material again. Recent experimental studies have been 
conceptualised as producing 'synthetic genomes' (Pennisi, 2005). Rather than adding 
individual genes to an existing genome, these experiments aim to ‘redesign’ genomes in a 
more global sense. Even if it remains to be seen what can be achieved with synthetic 
genomes, such entities could be readily argued to be man-made and patented under the 
chemical regime of DNA patenting that was established with the Chakrabarty. In the future, 
the patenting of genomes may well run together with patenting in the field of nanotechnology, 
or as one report speculates, be "coupled" to insights of systems biology to make useful 
organisms (U.S. Department of Energy, 2004). If so, how would these entities fit into the U.S. 
Patent Classification? 
 
With our study of three patent applications for whole genome sequences, we have shown how 
classification played a role in determining what kinds of entities were found to be patentable. 
In this way, the patent classification system will continue to play a role in the development of 
tomorrow’s technologies. It will be interesting to follow new types of biological patents – 
both informational and material – to see if they will force changes to the classification system 
as we saw with Chakrabarty, or whether the conservatism evident in our case study will 
prevail. It also remains to be seen whether complex informational models and synthetically 
modified nano-organisms will continue to be examined with respect to the categories 
provided by the existing classes of the U.S. Patent Classification, or whether new legal 
regimes, for example by drawing on other areas of the law, will be developed to establish 
ownership of such entities and inventions.
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1
 Philosophical efforts have gone into clarifying the gene concept (Beurton et al., 2000; Moss, 2003). 
For the purpose of this paper, we understand the term 'gene' in a similar fashion to molecular 
biologists or patent practitioners who seek to identify protein-coding genes and pursue patent claims 
for Open Reading Frames, or ORFs. At the molecular level, genes are functional parts of the genome 
that are characterised by a particular DNA sequence. The argument developed in this paper does not 
require a tighter definition of what we mean by a gene. 
2
 One might note, however, that other biological entities have been patented as computer-related 
inventions. For example, the 3D coordinates of the binding pocket of antibodies have been claimed as 
computer-systems for drug discovery (Armistead et al., 1999). 
3
 In addition to the genome patents discussed by O'Malley et al. (2005), perhaps an early precedent of 
genome patents are patents for plasmids as vectors for gene transfer (Manis, 1981). 
4
 For the H. influenzae genome, we ordered the examination file for patent application number 
(08/476,102), and for M. genitalium and M. jannaschii we ordered the files for patent applications 
(08/545,528) and (08/916,412) respectively. Although these were not necessarily the original patent 
applications filed for each genome, it was possible to obtain the original applications, which were 
abandoned, to ascertain that the patent applications we studied were practically the same as the 
original applications. The patent examination files we chose had the advantage that they were 
associated with more correspondence between the patent attorneys and applicants. We ordered these 
files through a document supply service in Washington, DC. 
5
 Patent applications are filed and prosecuted by law firms, and the process of patent examination can 
take several years. Due to staff turnover at the USPTO and at the law firm prosecuting the case, 
several different attorneys and examiners corresponded concerning each of the applications. For this 
reason, our references to 'the patent attorney' and to 'the patent examiners' can be read as idealisations 
of these actors as they emerge from our study of the patent examination process. If there are any face-
to-face or telephone interactions of the patent examiners and applicants, then the nature of these 
interactions is recorded in the file, and in the files only contained notes only on a few trivial 
interactions. For this reason, we take the file as being a good reflection of the whole examination 
procedure. 
6
 O. White was interviewed at The Institute for Genomic Research in Gaithersburg, Maryland, 
September 2004; R. Millman was interviewed by telephone at Alnylam Pharmaceuticals in March 
2006. Interviews were carried out by A.B., the first author of this paper. 
7
 This is now reclassified as Methanocaldococcus jannaschii. 
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8
 The patent arising from the H. influenzae genome patent application was issued on 4th March 2003 
(US patent no. 6,528,289); likewise for M. genitalium on 25th March 2003 (US patent no. 6,537,773), 
and for M. jannaschii on 28th Sept 2004 (US patent no. 6,797,466). 
9
 Possibly, the addition of the word 'fragment' was largely pro forma, as legal professionals often 
prefer established phraseology that has already been contested in previous case law. 
10
 Even if a claim for an isolated chromosome was formulated, one would also have to articulate a 
utility for this invention, which is not trivial, albeit vectors have been patented in this manner as tools 
for gene transfer. 
11
 Our discussion has focused on the patenting criteria of utility and novelty. Taking DNA patenting as 
a starting point, however, one would not expect that the criterion of non-obviousness would present a 
hurdle to patenting a whole genome in the way envisaged by the patent attorney. Although it may be 
'obvious' to determine the sequence of a DNA molecule of interest, whichever particular sequence one 
finds has long been held as non-obvious for the purposes of awarding biotechnology patents.   
12
 That patenting practice presupposes distinct areas of prior art also manifests itself in the way the 
basic requirements for patentability are applied differently in different fields. The requirements of 
nonobviousness, enablement, and written description are applied in strikingly different ways with 
respect to biotechnology and software (Naini, 2006). 
13
 The EPO, however, has the ordre public or public policy principle, which takes into account social 
and moral and economic values. 
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Figure 1: The claims of the patent application for the genome of Haemophilus influenzae  
(USPTO Patent Appl. No. 08/476,102). 
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Figure 2: The genome as a 'Computer-Related' Invention. (USPTO Patent Appl. No. 
08/476,102). 
